Abstract. We study several modal languages in which some (sets of) generalized quantifiers can be represented; the main language we consider is suitable for defining any first order definable quantifier, but we also consider a sublanguage thereof, as well as a language for dealing with the modal counterparts of some higher order quantifiers. These languages are studied both from a modal logic perspective and from a quantifier perspective. Thus the issues addressed include normal forms, expressive power, completeness both of modal systems and of systems in the quantifier tradition, complexity as well as syntactic characterizations of special semantic constraints. Throughout the paper several techniques current in the theory of generalized quantifiers are used to obtain results in modal logic, and conversely.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is motivated mainly by the following question: in the modal system $5 the box ('[]') and diamond ('~') may be interpreted as a universal and an existential quantifier, respectively (Goranko et al., 1992) ; how can other quantifiers be represented within a modal language?
We will consider a number of modal languages, each designed to represent (a set of) generalized quantifiers. The prime case is the language s in which every first order definable quantifier will turn out to be definable; a more modest language between the language of $5 and s will also be studied. The third language we will consider contains the modal counterparts of some higher order quantifiers. Furthermore, techniques used in these modal languages will be employed to get some results about 'quantifier languages'. This paper concentrates mainly on modal topics. Nevertheless, many issues addressed below find their origin in the theory of generalized quantifiers; and even some of the techniques used are current in the theory of generalized quantifiers rather than in modal logic. On the other hand, we will also use our modal machinery to contribute some results to the theory of generalized quantifiers.
To be more specific, this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce two modal languages E(QUANT) and E(QUANTk) for dealing with (sets of) first order definable quantifiers; a quick normal form theorem for these languages is proved, after which we compare them to other languages, both modal and classical. Section 3, then, contains completeness and complexity results for systems in both languages. Next, in Section 4, we ask some questions familiar from the theory of generalized quantifiers but now in a modal setting. Also, using our modal apparatus we arrive at a complete axiomatization of the set of quantifiers { more~ : n E N }, where more~XY holds between X, Y if IX n YI > n. Then, in Section 5, we move on to the realm of higher order quantifiers. A complete axiomatization is given for a modal operator simulating the quantifier there are at least as many Xs as Ys; after that some issues from earlier sections re-occur, and we have an exploratory look at modal operators simulating other higher order quantifiers. Section 6 rounds off this paper by formulating some conclusions and pointing at a number of directions for further research.
We want to thank Edith Spaan for her kind permission to include a result of hers in Section 3.3. We are also grateful to Johan van Benthem who fought several battles with text-editors in order to send us his comments on an earlier version of this paper.
THE SYSTEMS QUANT and QUANT k 2.1. Basic Definitions and Examples
DEFINITION 2.1. Let Prop be a set of proposition letters, and let Un and Bin be sets of unary and binary modal operators, respectively. The set of well-formed formulas over Prop and Un, Form(Prop, Un, Bin) (Prop, Un, Bin) Our main concern below are formulas built up using the set of unary operators { Mn, Ln : n E N }. Here, we consider Ln to be an abbreviation for '--,M,~'. We will sometimes also use the following abbreviations: M!0~ :: --,M0~, M!n(p := (M~-l~ A -,Mn(p) (n > 0). Instead of Form (Prop, { M,~, L~ ' n ff N }, 0) we write Form. A,/ ~ ~ is short for: for all w E W, M, w ~ ~; and W, w ~ ~p is short for: for all V, (IV, V), w ~ ~. We write W ~ ~ for: for all w it holds that Although this is not the first paper in which the operators Mn, Ln are being discussed, we believe that the above quantifier interpretation of these operators is in fact new. One of the first people to study the operators M~, L~ was Fine (1972) ; he gave the following interpretation to Mn: M~ is true at a world w in a Kripke model (W, R, V) if at least n R-successors of w satisfy ~. Our use of these operators is different from this interpretation in two respects: we have replaced 'at least n' in the previous sentence by 'more than n', and we only consider the special case in which R is the universal relation. In the mid 1980s Kit Fine's operators were rediscovered by several Italian logicians, and called graded modalities (Fattorosi-Bamaba et al. 1988) .
Parallel to definition 2.2 we can define a translation of elements of Form into monadic first order formulas. To be precise, let s be the language of first order logic with identity; s is s plus unary predicate letters P0,/91, P2,.. 9
corresponding to the elements of Prop. DEFINITION 2.3 . Let x be a fixed variable. The standard translation ST(~) taking 9) E Form to an s is defined as follows: it maps a proposition letter p to Px, and commutes with the Boolean connectives, while
ST(M~) = 3yo...Eyn( A (Yi ~ Yj) A A [yi/x]ST(~)),
where the yis are fresh variables.
Every model for s can be viewed as a model for formulas in Form,
and conversely. A simple induction establishes that .M, w ~ ~ iff A/t, w 
ST(~), and M ~ ST(~)
iff
Lo(A B) Mo(C A -B)
Mo(C A ~A).
Likewise, the generalized quantifier at least k A are B can be represented in our modal language by Mk-~ (A A B); this gives us the following simulation of so-called 'numerical' syllogisms (Atzeni et al., 1988) : 
M6(B A A)

M3(C A A)
Mo(B ^ c).
The basic principles governing the deductive behavior of the operators Mn and Ln are given in the following definition. L0~P) . Thus, the fragment of QUANTwith only L0, M0 as its modal operators is precisely $5. For this reason QUANT has been called $5 (van der Hoek, 1992) , or also S5n (Fine 1972 ).
It may amuse the reader to show that QUANT ~-Lo(~ --~ ~) -+ (Lo~
It will appear below (cf. 2.16) that in the language of QUANT we can define all first order definable quantifiers. Following a suggestion due to Valentin Shehtman we will also consider a more modest system called QUANT k that is somewhere in between $5 and QUANT. QUANT k has modal operators M0, L0 and Mk, Lk, for a fixed k > 0. The move from $5 to QUANT k is motivated by a similar move in the literature on axiomatic theories of specific quantifiers (cf. also Section 4.1), where pairs of dual quantifiers are not only studied in isolation, but also on top of well understood quantifiers like all and some (Westersthhl, 1989) . 
Normal Forms
The question whether a modal axiom system allows for a reduction of the depth of nesfings of modal operators is well motivated in the literature on modal logic. In the present setting this question receives additional motivation. Quantifiers express relations between subsets of a given model; this is reflected in the standard notation QXY for 'quantifier Q holds of the sets X and Y'. In a modal setting sets are typically represented by purely propositional formulas. Hence, the proper arguments of modal operators simulating quantifiers are the purely propositional formulas, or in any case, those that are reducible to such formulas. In this section we will prove a rather general normal forms theorem saying that every formula is equivalent to one without nestings of modal operators; from this we will be able to derive normal form results for a number of modal languages.
Let 
Log --+ (o(~,o~ v (/3 A g),~) ,--, (o(d,~ v/3, f') A g));
2. a V (/3 A g) 
Proof We only prove item 1. By propositional logic we have g --+ ((o~ V (/3 A g)) *-+ (a V/3)). Thus, since our logic is neat, we have Log --~ (Lo(c~ V (/3 A g)) ~ Lo(a V/3)). By 2.6.(3) this gives Log --+ (O(~, c~ V (/3 A g), ~) O(~,aV/3,)~)). Now, by 2.6.(2) we have for any qo, Log ~ (qo ~ (~A g)).
Thus it follows that Log --+ (O(~,a V (/3 A cr) 
Proof. By propositional logic and 2.6.(2) we have Log V L0~g. Now apply 2.7.
Lemma 2.8 may be rephrased as: if g is a prenex formula that occurs in THEOREM 2.11. In any neat logic in E(O) every formula ta is equivalent to a formula in NE Proof Induction on qo. The only interesting case is qo _= O(~, "7, 9~), where "7 is in NF and contains a prenex modal formula cr _= &(~', "7~, )~) in NF. Use 2.10 to write ~ as O(~, a V (/3 A g), 9~). Using 2.8 we see that qo is equivalent to (O(~,a V/3,)~) A g) V (O(~,a,)~) A --lo-). Repeating this argument we can remove all nested occurrences of modal operators from ~. -q 1 Maximal in the sense that it is not a strict subformula of a prenex formula.
COROLLARY 2.12. Over QUANT every ~ E Form is equivalent to a formula ~ E Form without nestings of modal operators.
Proof Here O = ( L0, M~ : n E N }. We leave it to the reader to check that QUANTis neat. q COROLLARY 2.13. Over QUANT k every ~ E Formk is equivalent to a formula f~ E Formk without nestings of modal operators.
Connections with Other Formalisms
When interpreted on models QUANT-formulas become equivalent to a special kind of monadic first order formulas. The notion of equivalence involved here may be understood in either a local or global sense: a first order formula c~(x) E s is locally equivalent to a QUANT-formula ~ if for all .AA, and all w E •, we have .A4, w ~ p ~ c~(x); o~ E 13 and ~ are called globally equivalent if for all AA, AA ~ p iff.AA ~ oL. (Clearly, if~ is locally equivalent to o~(x), then it is globally equivalent to Vx a.)
From 2.12 we derive PROPOSITION 2.14.
On models every ~ E Form is (locally) equivalent to a Boolean combination of E~ each of which has at most one free variable.
It's the converse of this proposition that is more interesting: which monadic first order formulas are equivalent to a QUANT-formula on models? We can prove every 131-sentence to be equivalent to (the ST-translation of) some QUANT-formula by using a special case of the Ehrenfeucht-Fra'iss6 Theorem. For full details and a proof of this result we refer the reader to Westersthhl (1989: Section 1.7). DEFINITION2.15. Fix a finite set of proposition letters Prop = (P0, 9 9 Pk-1 }. Let 131k denote the monadic first order language into which the modal language with this restricted set of proposition letters translates via the ST-translation; so s only has k unary predicate letters P0, 9 9 9 Pk-l-ff X _C W, then X ~ = X, X 1 = W \ X; if ~ is a formula, p0 = p, ~1 = ~p. For s E 2 ~, we use Ps to denote both the partition set and the partition conjunction associated with s:
,
{/2/}l<i<22k is used both to enumerate all possible unions (including the empty one) of partition sets, and to enumerate all possible disjunctions (including the empty one) of partition conjunctions. We use 79{ ~ and/gi 2~t to denote the extensions of ~s and L/i in some given model A/I. Proof To simplify our argument, assume that a = oz(P0,..., Pk-1) C 121 contains only the predicate letters indicated. Let n be the quantifier rank of oz.
The number of ,-on-equivalence classes is finite. Let 341,..., 349 be representatives of the ,-~n-classes that contain models of oz. k <_ rL, n is the quantifier rank of ST(99) }.
We believe the natural setting for the system QUANT to be the realm of models rather than that of frames. For, one may understand (binary) quantifiers as expressing relations between subsets of some given universe -hence the natural surrounding for quantifiers are models of some monadic language, e.g., models for QUANT or for a monadic first order language.
Nevertheless, we do want to state some results on frame related topics.
First, as far as definability of frames is concerned, the language of QUANT is equivalent to the language of first order logic over identity. PROPOSITION 2.18. On frames every QUANT-formula is equivalent to a sentence of first order logic over identity.
Proof All first order formulas over identity are equivalent to Boolean combinations of formulas expressing the existence of at least a certain number of elements. These are obviously definable by means of QUANT-formulas. Conversely, using the ST-translation QUANT-formulas can be translated into equivalent closed second-order formulas containing only monadic predicate variables. These are equivalent to first order formulas over identity (Ackermann, 1954 Claim. If for all k E N there is an I > k such that ~ E K, then for some n E N we have -T'ra E K for all m > n.
Proof of the Claim. Assume that K satisfies the antecedent of the Claim.
By 2.18 ~ is equivalent to a first order sentence c~. Let n be the quantifier rank of a; this will turn out to be the n we are looking for. Choose any .Tt E K with 1 > n. Then .T t ~ qo. Now, consider the special case of the earlier notions -n and ~n, relative, this time, to a first order language without unary predicate symbols P0, P1,..., i.e., in a language with = only. Then, the appropriate models are in fact the frames .T for our Returning to the main argument, suppose that K/~-is infinite. Then, by the Claim .T,~ E K for all m > n, for some n. Then K/-~ must contain all (representantives of) infinite frames as well, by arguments similar to those establishing the Claim. It follows that Kc/~ can only contain finite frames .Tt for l < n; but then KC/---must be finite. If, on the other hand, K/~ is finite, then K/~ cannot contain infinite frames, for otherwise it would contain arbitrarily large finite ones, and thus be infinite. So, if K/~ is finite, it must be a finite set of finite frames, as required. -q 3. COMPLETENESS AND COMPLEXITY
Prerequisites
A completeness proof for the system QUANT may be found in Fine (1972) . There it is shown that QUANT is complete with respect to all frames of the form (W, R), where R is an equivalence relation that provides the interpretation for L0; in this setting the operators M., Ln mean: 'more than n Rsuccessors satisfy ... ' and 'at most n R-successors falsify ... '. However, since QUANT-formulas are preserved under generated subframes of such 'non-standard' frames, we can derive from Fine's completeness result that QUANT is complete w.r.t, the standard frames in which the modal operators receive their quantifier interpretation.
In van der Hoek (1992) the finite model property for QUANTis established;
there, it is shown that the size of the model needed to refute a non-theorem ~p is bounded by g(~). 2#% Here, g(~), the grade of ~, is defined inductively as follows: g(p) = 0, g(~) = g(~o), g(~ A ~b) = max(g(qo), g(~b)), and g(Mn~) = max(n + 1, g(~)); and #~ is simply the number of (occurrences of) of symbols in qo, e.g., #M7(p A ~p) equals 5. Adopting an argument due to (Ladner, 1977) , we can obtain a better upper bound:
Then ~o is satisfiable iff ~o is satisfiable in a model with at most 1 + #qo. g(~) elements.
Proof Let ~o be satisfied in a QUANT-model .AA = (W, V). We will use the subformulas of ~o as instructions for extracting a set of elements W' from W that will serve as the domain of the desired small model. A function 1-" is defined inductively on the instances of subformulas of ~o. By 2.16 the above proposition implies that properties of first order definable quantifiers may be decided on finite models.
The method used in 3. l may also be used to establish:
Then ~ is satisfiable iff it is satisfiable in a model with at most 1 + ( k + 1) 9 #~ elements.
Completeness of QUANT k
We will prove the completeness of QUANT~ via a Henkin-like construction.
For a consistent formula g~ we will build a canonical model A/It containing, for each maximal consistent set A, at most k + 1 copies of A, together with a relation Rc on .Me to interpret the modal operators. To obtain a model in which the modal operators receive their intended interpretations, it will then be sufficient to show that cp is true in a point in some part of the canonical model on which Rc is total.
Our completeness proof for QUANT k differs from Kit Fine's completeness proof for QUANT in the following respect. If we wanted to prove the completeness of QUANT using the method just sketched, we would have to construct a canonical model that may contain, for each maximal consistent set A, infinitely many copies of A. Fine, on the other hand, first introduces, for every k, an accessibility relation Rk to interpret Mk. In order to end up with a standard model he then maps these relations onto a single one.
Proof. We have
Proof By definition of R~, Re-successors of (F,j) don't depend on jthis proves item 1. To prove item 2, if h # 0, and {F,j)R~(A, h), then we have that t5 E A implies Mkt5 E F. So by axiom B5, M0t5 E F, but then (F,j)Rc{A, 0) holds. Finally, to prove item 3, assume (F,j)Rc{A, 1). Then (F,j)Rc{A, h) for any h E { 1,..., k }, and by item 2 also {F,j)Rr 0). Conversely, ifM0~b E P, then the set {~b} U {7 : LoT E F} can be extended to a maximal QUANTk-consistent set A by standard modal arguments. Then (P, j/_R~(A, 0/; hence, by the induction hypothesis we have (r,j) Mor Next, assume that ~ _=-Mkr and let .A4~, (r, j) ~,~ Mkr We distinguish two cases. The first one is that for some A, ~ E L and (F,j)Rc (A, k) . Then, by definition of Re, Mkr E F. The second case is that there is no ~ such that ~ E A and (F,j)Rr k). By 3.5. (2) and (3) Conversely, if Mkr E F, then, by axiom B1, M0r E F. Reasoning as in the case ofMor E P we find a Ao such that ~p E Ao and (F,j)Rr Now, if there is such a Ao with the additional property that (r, j)RdAo, k), then we are done by 3.5 and the induction hypothesis. Otherwise, there is some 6o E Ao with -,Mk6o E F. Hence, by 3.4, Mo(r A -,5o) E F -but this implies the existence of a A1 for which (r,j)Rc(A~, 0), Ao r A1, and ~bA-~o E A1.
By assumption we don't have (r, j)R~ (A~, k) . Repeating this argument, we find pairwise different sets Ao,..
. ,A~ with (I',j)R~(/xg,O) and r E 2x~
(0 < i < k). Hence, by the induction hypothesis, A4~, (r, j) ~n Mkr -q LEMMA 3.7.
Rc is serial (i.e., it satisfies VxSy xRy); 2. R~ is euclidean (i.e., it satisfies Vxyz (xRy A xRz --* yRz)).
Proof. Item 1 is immediate: ~p E F implies MoW E P by axiom B1; hence, we have (F, j)R~(F, 0). To prove item 2, suppose (F,j}Rr and (F,j) Rc(2, m}. If m = 0 then ~ E ~ implies Moor E P which implies LoMo~r E r (axiom B2), hence Moor E A. But then {A,
I)R~(E, m). If rn ~ 0 then cr C E implies Mko" E F, hence LoMk~r E F. Thus Mko-E"A, whichmeansthat (A, I)Rc(E, rn). q
To prove that a consistent formula qo has a model, it suffices to find a model All = (W,R,V) such that for some w E W, AA,w ~ ~, and such that R is total on .M. Now, a relation R that is euclidean and serial need not be total. However, for our purposes it suffices that such an R is 'almost total' in the following sense: Vxyz (xRny A xRraz --~ yRz). The proof that any serial, euclidean relation is almost total is left to the reader.
Proof Proving soundness is left to the reader. To show completeness, assume is QUANTk-consistent. Then, by axiom B1, so is M0~. Thus for some maximal QUANTk-consistent set F we have M0~ E F. Lemma 3.6 gives .Me, (F, 0) ~ M0~. We may of course assume that .Me is R~-generated by (F, 0); by 3.7 A/I~ is serial and euclidean.
Me, (P, 0} ~n M0~ implies that for some (A, i) we have (P, 0)Re(A, i) and .Me, (A,/) ~ qo. Let .hA be the submodel Re-generated by (A, i}. Then, we have .M, (A, i) ~n (P, and on A/l, R~ is the universal relation, so the modal operators receive their intended interpretations in .M, i.e., .M, (A, i) ~ ~. -q Note that, by Lemma 3.6, Theorem 3.8 generalizes to strong completeness, i.e., to the case of deductions from arbitrary sets of sentences. 
Complexity
Recall that in w we gave upper bounds for the size of the model needed to satisfy a consistent formula ~ in terms of #~ (the number of symbols in ~) and g(~): 1+ the highest n occurring as subscript in an operator Mn in ~. From a computational point of view it is more natural to have a bound in terms of the length of the representation of ~p. (So IMnl is the length of the representation of n.) PROPOSITION 3.10. The problem of determining whether a formula qo E Forrn~, k E N>0, is satisfiable is NP-complete. Proof It suffices to show that the problem is in NP. But this follows from 3.1. First guess a model with at most 1 + (k + 1) 9 [qo[ elements. Then determine the validity of each subformula in each element, starting with the proposition letters occurring in ~. This can be done in polynomial time. -~ What about QUANT-satisfiability? By an argument due to Edith Spaan QUANT-satisfiability is in PSPACE. Below, an algorithm is given that tests for QUANT-satisfiability, and is in PSPACE. The main idea behind this algorithm is that the truth-value of a QUANT-formula (possibly containing modal operators) in a model, is completely determined by Boolean combinations of proposition letters, and the number of occurrences of such combinations in the model. This idea will be implemented in our test for QUANT-satisfiability as follows.
Given a formula p we first consider certain propositional counterparts of ~ and its subformulas; we then guess a number (intuitively, the size of the model) and valuations, in the meantime determining how often these propositional combinations will occur in the resulting model. Finally, we reconsider the original formula p, and show how its truth-value is determined by its propositional counterpart.
Fix some formula ~. We need some preliminary notions. For 0 E Form, CI(0) is the smallest set containing 0 and closed under subformulas. To determine the propositional counterpart of ~, let/~ be a new symbol.
* For O E Form define strip(O) as follows: have it satisfy the "counts".) Next, we have to check that this model is a model for ~ -to this end we connect up the propositional formulas in STRIP(~p) with the modal formulas from Cl(~p). This is done using a function f. To be precise, we define a function f : CI(~) ~ STRIP(~) for which it is easily seen that the number of worlds satisfying g) in the model 34 equals count(f(~)) for every ~ E CI(~):
and -~3_ ___ T), -to define f(~l A 02) we have to distinguish a number of cases:
The above definition may seem somewhat laborious, but it really is necessary to distinguish the various cases, since f(~l A ~z) can be in STRIP(~) while f(~l) A f(~2) need not be in it, cf. the example below.)
By simply following the inductive definition of f it is clear that the number of worlds satisfying ~b in 34 equals count(f(~)) for any ~ E CI(~). To continue our earlier example, let ~/ ___ Map A q, and assume that
have that
To sum up, given a formula ~ as input, run the Algorithm on ~, and verify whether count(f(qo)) > 0. Since the Algorithm is in PSPACE and the function f is obviously in P, the entire procedure must be in PSPACE.
THEOREM 3.11. The problem of determining whether a formula 9~ C Form is satisfiable is in PSPACE.
It is still open whether or not QUANT-satisfiability is also PSPACE-hard.
SEMANTIC CONSTRAINTS AND INFERENTIAL PATTERNS
In this section some topics familiar from generalized quantifier theory are addressed in a modal setting; also, some applications are given of the systems QUANT and QUANT k to these topics.
Semantic Constraints
In this subsection we consider some well-known semantic constraints on quantifiers, and try to match them up with syntactic restrictions on modal formulas. On the way we will give some examples of how our modal apparatus allows us to translate our semantic (Boolean) intuitions into syntactic ones.
Most results will be stated for QUANT-formulas only, but they have an immediate analogue for QUANTk-formulas.
Let us fix some terminology first. Following Westersffdal (1989) we define a (binary) generalized quantifier to be a function assigning to every set .h4 a binary relation QM between subsets of .hi, and we recall that the conditions imposed to obtain so-called logical quantifiers are
A first order sentence o~(Po, P1 ) satisfies the combined conditions CON-SERV (for P0) and EXT iff it is logically equivalent to some sentence with all quantifiers P0-restricted (Westerstfihl 1989: Theorem 3.2.3 ). An obvious question here is whether a similar characterization exists for QUANT-formulas.
We 
Mk-~(p A D) A ~Mk(p
should be rewritten as
Mk-l(p A D) A Mk+l-lD A -,Mk+ID A -,Mt(~p A D).
Other combinations may be rewritten in a similar way. Let (I) t be the formula that arises from 9 by applying the above rewriting recipe. A related topic in the theory of generalized quantifiers is the relational behavior of quantifiers. A typical result in this area is the following: on the finite sets the quantifier all is the only logical quantifier that is both transitive (VXYZ, (QXYAQYZ-+QXZ) ) and reflexive (VX (QXX)) (van Benthem 1984: Theorem 3.1.4). Here, we put our modal apparatus to work to characterize the logical (first order) quantifiers that are symmetric, i.e., that satisfy
VXY (QXY --~QYX).
Let a(P0,/91) be a first order sentence with quantifier rank q. From our remarks following 2.16 we know that a(P0, P1) has a semantic normal form (Note that the highest number occurring in any 4-tuple in R~ is q, the quantifier rank of o~.) A look at the semantic normal form of c~ may lead one to conjecture that c~ is symmetric just in case we may swap the arguments of the second and third conjunct in any disjunct in the semantic normal form of o~, and still retain an equivalent of o~. To see that this is indeed the case, define for a given set R,~, the set R* to be { (a, c, b, d} 9 (a, b, c, d ) E R~ }. The kind of reasoning our modal language has lead us to in the previous proof is pretty much the same as the type of argument that is usually employed in connection with the the Tree of Numbers (see van Benthem 1986 for details). 
Inferential Patterns
The inferential patterns satisfied by some fixed quantifier Q have been studied on at least three levels of analysis. A purely relational (or syllogistic) level is the minimal one, where the admissible formulas are Boolean combinations of formulas of the form QXY with X, Y without any structure. A typical result here says that symmetry and quasi-refexivity (QXY/QXX) completely axiomatize the syllogistic theory of some (van Benthem 1984: Theorem 3.3.5). On a second level of analysis one adds Boolean structure to the arguments X, Y of Q; to give an example: the property CONSERV (Westerst~hl 1989 : Section 4). To express even stronger properties of quantifiers one can move up to richer languages. For example, one might add constants for all and some to the Boolean level, and analyze one's favorite quantifier on top of this enriched Boolean language. But, the modal approach of the present paper also resides on this third level. We obviously allow for more 'types' of formulas than those allowed for in the Boolean approach. However, since in principle we can do without nestings of modal operators according to 2.16, the modal approach is rather close to the Boolean one.
(QAB/QA(B N A) and QA(B A A)/QAB) resides at this level, as well as irreflexivity (QAA/W)
This close connection between the two approaches suggests at least two lines of investigations as far as the inferential theory of specific quantifiers is concerned. For a start, we can ask questions familiar from the Boolean approach, but now lifted to the modal level. An example of such a question concerns the extent to which the syntactic behavior of a quantifier (or a set of quantifiers) determines its (their) semantic behavior. The completeness results for QUANT and QUANT k given in Section 3 fall under this heading; what they amount to is that the respective sets of axioms say all one can say about the sets of operators { mn " n _> 0 } and { mn " n = 0, k } in s and s
Note that these sets of operators are not determined by their respective axiomatizations in the sense of Westerstgthl (1989: Section 4.5). For these axioms are also satisfied by the modal operators ~n, where (W, R,...), v ~ ~ng~ if there are more than n R-successors ofvthat satisfy 9~, where R is an equivalence relation. Even if we restrict our attention to models for monadic first order logic there is no determination of { Mn " n > 0 } or { M0, Mk } (k > 0) by their respective axiomatizations; to see this one can adapt the arguments of Westersffthl (1989: Corollary 4.5.10).
Another option suggested by the close connection between the Boolean and modal approach to quantifiers, is to try and solve questions from the Boolean level of analysis using our modal intuitions and results. Along this line we will present a complete axiomatization of the Boolean counterparts mOren of our modal operators Mn; so morenXY denotes the quantifier IX n Y I > n.
The language EB is built up as follows. It has p rimitives (X, ]/",...) built up from unary predicate letters P0, P1, 9 9 9 using (.)c n; below we will often pretend that primitives are propositional formulas built up from the 'proposition letters' P0, P1, .... The atomic formulas of s have the form morenXY, where n E N, and X, Y are primitives. From these, formulas are built up in the usual way. Some useful abbreviations are allbut,*XY := -~raOrenXY c, and precisely,*XY, which is defined as -~moreoXY if n = 0, and as moven_l XY A -~more,*XY otherwise.
Loosely speaking, s corresponds to a fragment of s in which every formula is a Boolean combination of formulas of the form Mn~, where is purely propositional. So given the fact that the axioms A1-A5 axiomatize the complete theory of the operators Mn, an obvious conjecture for a complete set of axioms in EB is arrived at by deleting from the list of QUANT-axioms those by which the number of nestings of operators may be altered, i.e., leave out A1 and A2. Apart from one additional axiom governing the way in which the operators more,, combine with Boolean operators inside their arguments, this is in fact all we will need! DEFINITION 4.5. The logic B-QUANT (for the Boolean counterpart of QUANT) is defined as follows. Its rules of inference are Modus Ponens, Substitution, and a restricted version of Necessitation: if the primitive X (considered as a propositional formula) is derivable in propositional logic, then allbutoTVX is a theorem of B -QUANT. Besides those of propositional logic its axioms are:
A3' allbutoXY -* (more~TX -+ more~TY); A4' allbutoXY c -~ (precisely~ T X A pr eciselym TY -~ p~ecisely~+~ T ( X U Y));
A5' moren+lXY -~ more~XY;
A6 more~XY ~-+ more~T(X N Y).
Here's a result we will need later on: Proof We only prove item 1; item 2 is straightforward, and item 3 follows from item 1. By definition we have -~pveciselYoXY --+ moreoXY and 
~preciselYlXY -~ -~(moreoXY A ~morelXY).
Putting this together gives-~preciselyoXY --~ (-~preciselyiXY --* morelXY
M o,..XY iff IV(X) V(Y)i >
We say that ~ is valid iff for all AA, .M ~ ~.
As with QUANT-formulas we can define a notion of grade for s formulas: gr(~) = 1 + max{ n : more~XY occurs in ~ }. A formula C s is said to be in disjunctive normal form (DNF) if it is a disjunction of literals (i.e., of (negated) atomic formulas). Using the fact that every propositional folxnula has a DNF, we have that every ~ E s has a DNF.
To prove the completeness of B-QUANT we assume that ~ E s is consistent, and try to find a model for ~. To this end it suffices to find a model for a disjunct ~ in the DNF of ~. For the time being we fix r to be such a conjunction of literals in s Let P0,..., Pk-1 be the proposition letters occurring in r Recall from Section 2.3 that Ps (s E 2 k) denotes a partition set, and b/i (1 < i < 22k) a (possibly empty) union of partition sets. For the remainder of this section we write L for the empty union of partition sets, and 7-for the union of all partition sets. Define MORE(C) = { (-~)morenlgilgj 9 1 <_ i,j <_ 22k,n < gr(r 2k+l So IMORE@) I = 2. gr(~). 2 . Define a subset 9 of MORE(~b) as follows.
First of all, it contains all conjuncts occurring in % and secondly, it is maximal consistent in MORE(~b). DEFINITION 4.8. The canonical model 3de = (We, Vc) is defined as follows. To each partition set 7"s (s E 2 k) associate a set of primitives IIs in such a way that 7"s EIIs, and H~ is maximal consistent (in propositional logic, and in the fragment containing only the 'proposition letters' P0, 9 9 9 Pk-1).
W~ is a set pairs (Us, n) such that (II~, n) EWc iff morenT7"s E 9; Vc is defined by putting (II~, n) E V~(P) iff P EIIs (0 < n _< gr(r s E 2k).
LEMMA 4.9 (Truth Lemma). Let X E MORE(C). Then X E 9 iff .Mc ~ X. Proof. Assume X -morenblilgj. Then for some 7"1,..., 7"s we have k (/di n b/j) ~ (7'1 U... U 7"~) in propositional logic.
Assume Adc ~ morenbliblj, i.e., Ale ~ morenT(7"l U... UT's), by the soundness of axiom A6. Then there are n l,..., n~ such that (1-It, nt -1 ) E W~ (1 < t < s), and nl + "" + ns = m > n. By the definition of Wc we have morent-lTT't E 9 (1 < t < 8). Now obviously, if u r v (1 < u < v <_ 8 -1) then ~-((791 V ... V 7",,) A 7"~) ~ _1_ in propositional logic; hence ~-allbuto(7"l V ... V 7",,)(7"~)~ in B-QUANT. By repeated applications of 4.6.(3) this yields more,n_lT(7"l U... U 7"s) E 9. But m -1 > n, hence axiom A5' gives morenT(7"l U... U 7"~) E 9; but then, more~blilgj E 9, by the maximal consistency of 9.
For the converse we have to do a little more work. Suppose X E 9. By A6 and Substitution we have more~T(7"l U ... U 7"s) E 9. We distinguish two possibilities.
1. For some t, 1 <_ t <_ s, mOrenTT't E 9. Then, by axiom A5 ~, the fact that 9 is deductively closed, and the definition of Wc, we have (IIt,0),... (Ht,n) E Ado. Hence, A4~ ~ rnore~TT't; thus A,t~ ~ morenT(7"l U... U 7"~), and so JMc ~ more~LtiLlj.
2. For no t (1 < t <_ s), morenTT't E 9. Then, by 4.6.(1), we can conclude that there are nl,..., ns-1 such that preciselymTT't E 9 (1 < t < s -1). Put m = nl + " 9 + ns-1. If m > n, we are done. For then we have 7"l U... U 7"~ occurring in nt copies of IIt for each t E { 1,..., s -1); this implies 3A~ ~ morenT (7" 
. U 7)s).
But the latter disjunction implies -~morenT (7) (7) The method used to prove B-QUANT complete in 4.10 may also be used to give an alternative completeness proof for QUANT or QUANT k. We preferred to prove the completeness of QUANT k the way we did it in Section 3.2, simply because the method used there is somewhat closer to the modal tradition.
The question settled by Theorem 4.10 is related to a question due to Johan van Bentbem, who asked for a complete axiomatization of the schemes common to all quantifiers somen (n E N>0). A6 and 4.6.(2) are two such schemes; and, in the richer language where one has all and some available, A3 ~ is a further example.
BEYOND THE FIRST ORDER BOUNDARY
In this section we will consider some higher order quantifiers as modal operators. The leading character in this section will be the quantifier there are at least as many Xs as Ys. The choice to consider this particular quantifier is motivated by the fact that we can use an existing calculus to axiomatize the valid inference patterns that hold of this quantifier. Also, using the quantifier there are at least as many Xs as Ys, a number of other higher order quantifiers can be defined and studied.
The plan for this section is as follows. We first introduce some notation and an axiom system QM for a modal operator atleast (.,.) . After that we prove a completeness theorem for this system. Then, some themes from sections 2.2 and 4.1 re-emerge when we prove a normal form theorem, characterize the QM-formulas satisfying CONSERV and EXT, and prove a (partial) Lyndon Theorem for the modal language with atleast. We complete this section by taking an exploratory look at some modal operators representing other higher order quantifiers.
Axioms and Notation
First, let us set up our language. Let Form > abbreviate Form (Prop, ~, { atIeast }) . Here are some useful abbreviations we will use: atleast(v, T) more (v, r = atleast(~, r A -~atleast(r V) most (~,r =--more(~ A~,vA-~r equal(v , ~b) =_ atleast(v, r A atleast(r ~) .
LoV
Given that the intended reading of atleast(~, ~b) is: there are at least as many ~s as ~bs, the intended interpretations of the above abbreviations should be obvious from the notation. Before plunging into axiomatics, let us briefly answer two questions that may arise at this point. First, is there are at least as many Xs as Ys indeed higher order? Suppose it is not; then it has a first order definition c~(X, Y), say of quantifier rank n, Let AJ = (W, P,.. Second, one might well wonder why we don't use a unary modal operator to simulate there are at least as many Xs as Ys, -just like we used the unary operator L0 to simulate the quantifier all XY. An obvious candidate would be the operator Oa with Oaqo true at a world in a model iff there are at least as many worlds that verify p as there are worlds verifying -,~. But, although Oa is certainly definable in terms of atleast, the latter can not be defined in terms of the former; to see this one can adapt a result due to Barwise and Cooper saying that the binary quantifier most is not definable using the Rescher quantifier QR (Westerstfihl 1989 : Section 1.7). 
qYg~ --+ (atleast(qoo, gao) A . .. A atleast(~om_l, ~bm_,) --+ atleast( r ~m ) ) .
Here, for m E N, qSg~7 expresses a kind of generalized equivalence. It is defined as follows. For a sequence -7 = (70,. 9 9 %~) of m + 1 formulas, let Ti(~7) be a statement that is true iff exactly i elements in ~ are true. E.g. if
, and T2('7) = (Po Apl).
Loosely speaking, when interpreted on a model, the right-hand side of (2) says that every point of the model is balanced in the sense that i formulas from the sequence ~5 are true in a point iff i formulas from the sequence are true in that point (0 < i < m + 1). Hence, what D(m) expresses is that if each point is balanced, and if, in addition, for each of the first m components of q5 we have that their extension is at least as big as the extension of the corresponding components of ~7, -then the extension of the last component of ~ should not be smaller than the extension of the last component of 93. At least for finite models D(m) is a perfectly sound principle; that it is not sound on infinite models is shown in our remarks preceding 5.3.
Let's see this system in action. We will derive a formula expressing additivity of there are at least as many As as Bs: L0-~(~ A X) A L0-~(r A X) ~ (atleast(~, (;) --+ atleast(~ V X, 0 V X)). (We use 93g-~ to denote ~g~ with the operator L0 left out; PL is short for propositional logic.)
Obviously we have,
Now, by PL, ~X implies (qo ~ (~ v X)) A ((~b V X) ~ tb), so by (3) we have
Then, again by PL, we have
So by (4) and (5) this implies
Applying Necessitation and D(2) to (6), we find
Lo-~(~ A X) A Lo-~(r A X) --+ (atleast(~,~) ~ atleast(~ V X,O V X)).
To complete this introductory section on QM, let us briefly mention an alternative proposal to analyze the quantifier there are at least as many Xs as Ys, that is due to Johan van Benthem (private communication). He suggested to consider some mixture of modal logic and additive arithmetic, with atomic statements of the form atleasf (A, B) and Eixi >_ ~jyj, where the xi and yj are numerical variables ranging over cardinalities of subsets of the universe.
Completeness
In Giirdenfors (1975) a completeness result for QM is given with respect to a special class of so-called probability models. Combining this result with a result from (van der Hoek, 1991), we can derive a completeness result for QM with respect to models in which atleast and Lo receive their intended interpretations.
To state these results, we need some definitions. Recall that a probability measure on a set W is a function P : 2 w ---+ [0, 1] that satisfies (i) P(W) = 1, (ii) P (0) Our next aim is to prove the completeness of QM with respect to models in which the modal operators receive their intended quantifier interpretations.
To do this it suffices to show that QM is complete w.r.t, qualitative models in which R is an equivalence relation. For then, QM ( ~ implies that for some qualitative model .A4 in which R is an equivalence relation, At, w ~ ~. Taking the submodel generated by w gives a model Att in which ~ is refuted, and in which R is the universal relation. Hence, atleast and L0 receive their intended interpretations in At1. Although we do not want to discuss the complexity of QM-satisfiability in this paper, we feel that it may be shown to be in one or other complexity class in pretty much the same way as QUANT-satisfiability was shown to be in PSPACE in Section 3.3.
Normal Forms and Semantic Constraints
Using our general result on normal forms from Section 2.2 we give a quick proof for the existence of syntactic normal forms for formulas in Form >.
After that we determine 'semantic' normal forms for such formulas, and use these to obtain syntactic characterizations of various semantic constraints. Proof Let (9 = { Lo, atleast }. Prove that QM is neat, and apply 2.11.
Our next aim is to find an Ehrenfeucht-Fra'issd-like characterization for QM-formulas, and use this to find syntactic counterparts for a number of semantic constraints, as we did in Section 4.1.
First, we have to give some definitions. To simplify matters we assume that we are working in a restricted language with proposition letters P0,.. 9 Pk-1; the appropriate models then have the form (W,/9o,..., Pk-1), with W finite. Recall from Section 2.3 that we use 7~i to denote partition sets (or partition conjunctions), and L/j to denote unions of partition sets (or disjunctions of partition conjunctions). Define Using these semantic normal forms one can try and find syntactic counterparts (in Form >_) of semantic constraints, just like we did in Section 4.1.
However, the semantic normal forms for QM-formulas are much more complex than those found for QUANT-formulas in Section 2.3. (Indeed, the proof of the Ehrenfeucht-Fraiss6 Theorem for QM was already more complex than the corresponding result for QUANT, or first order logic (Westerst~hl 1989: Section 1.7). Consequently, manipulations on semantic normal forms for QM have to be more abstract and involved than they were in the proofs of e.g. 4.1 and 4.2, as is witnessed below. 
We leave it to the reader to check that for any V on W, (W, V) ~ r iff (W, V) satisfies (8).
Let V be a valuation for ~b ~ on W such that V(p) C_ V'(p) is minimal, while V(q) = V'(q) for q ~ p. Then, in (W, V), we have that x3 = x5 = x7 = x8 = x13 = x15 = 0.
This is trivial for xs, x7, x 13, x15. Hence, (W, Y) ~ r By the monotonicity of ~ this implies (W, V') 7 ~ -as required. -t Since, in 5.10, we have restricted ourselves to QM-formulas that are equivalent to disjunctions of formulas of the form (~)atleast(x1, X2), with X1, X2 purely propositional, we have only proved a 'partial' Lyndon Theorem there; to prove a Lyndon Theorem for the full language we would have to consider disjunctions of conjunctions of formulas of the above form (this is because of 5.6). We believe that there is indeed a Lyndon Theorem for the full language of QM. However, we doubt whether the method we used in 5.10 to prove a partial Lyndon Theorem would be the most efficient way to obtain the more general result.
Other Higher Order Quantifiers
Just like the systems QUANT and QUANTk did not determine the sets of operators { Mn : n E N } and { M0, Mk }, respectively, QM does not determine atleast; QM also axiomatizes the complete modal theory of the operator there are at least as many R-successors satisfying X as there are satisfying Y, where R is an equivalence relation. And by 5.2, QM also axiomatizes the modal theory of the probabilistic quantifier 'X is at least as likely as Y', where the underlying probability measure is not based upon statistic bearings but interpreted 'subjectively' (see Gardenfors 1975 for a brief explanation of how the latter is accounted for by our axioms C5 and C6).
When added to first order logic the quantifiers most and move yield languages that are not equivalent as far as their expressive power is concerned (Westerst~thl 1989). However, on top of $5, the three quantifiers atleast, more, and most (considered as modal operators) all yield the same language in this respect. Given the abbreviations introduced at the start of Section 5.1, to establish this claim it suffices to show that atleast can be defined in terms of more (which can be done as follows: atleast(~, ~) *-+ -~more(~b, qo)), and that it can also be defined in terms of most. On finite models the latter is indeed possible; ff (W, V) is such a model, then atleast( , ) IV( )I >_ IV(r ,--, > Iv(v))l)
--moat@ 9 @, where X | Y is the symmetric difference of X and Y. This equivalence implies, of course, that the modal languages with atleast and moat, respectively, are equally expressive on finite models (but, as one of the anonymous referees pointed out, these modal languages are not equally expressive on infinite models). Finally, from the above observations it follows that we can extract complete axiomatizations (for validity on finite models) for the modal operators more and most from the complete axiomatization we have given for atleast. A natural extension of QM and its language arises when we consider atleast not in isolation, but together with one or more operators atleaatn (n > 0), where atleastn(~, r is interpreted as 'there are at least n times as many qos as es'. Here, we want to elaborate a bit on a possible axiomatization QM2 for the modal language with atleast and atleast2. QMs should at least contain the system QM (for atleast), and also axioms corresponding to those in 2.6 to ensure that we have a decent normal form theorem. These normal forms are disjunctions of conjunctions of the form f2 A (-,) 
-~(atleast(~x,X) A (L0~(p A X) A equal(p,x ) --+ atleast(~2, p V X))),
where p is a proposition letter not occurring in ~, X. To get this reduction to work we should have two additional derivation rules (either derived from the axioms, or explicitly added) that amount to if for all proposition letters p we have
(R +) ~-(equal(p,x) A Lo~(p A X) A atIeast(r V X)) -+ ~, then ~-atleast2(r X) --+ ~,
and if for all proposition letters p we have
~-6 --+ (atleast(-~X, X) A (Lo(p A X) A equal(q, X) --* (R-) atleast(r q V X))), then f-~5 ~ atleast2(~, X).
All in all, assuming that QM2 contains R + and R-we get the following reduction of provability in QM2 to provability in QM. Assume ~ is consistent in QM2; we may assume that ~p is in NF. Thus, one of the disjuncts ~t in ~ is consistent in QM2. Using R + and R-one can find a formula ~" C Form> such that ~" is consistent in QM iff ~ is consistent in QM2. Now apply 5.3 to find a model for ~". It is easily verified that this model is also a model for the original formula ~.
FURTHER DIRECTIONS; CONCLUDING REMARKS
One might remark that many of our results do not seem to depend on our modalpoint of view. As a first reaction to this remark the authors of this paper would probably agree. But then, after some thought, we would say that we do not claim that modal logic is the answer to all questions in generalized quantifier theory. What we have attempted to do in this paper is to mix the modal and quantifer tradition, and explore some connections between the two, starting from the observation that at a basic level the two traditions share some essential features: they are both variable free formalisms whose model theory is Venn Diagrams. This cross-fertilization has brought a number of questions and techniques familiar from the theory of generalized quantifiers to modal logic; this gave rise to several non-trivial results. Conversely, we have been able to use well-understood facts and tools from modal logic to obtain some non-trivial results in generalized quantifier theory. We think that two of the main features of the modal languages used in this paper are the following. First, in these modal languages complex, non-constructive standard proofs can be replaced by simple, effective manipulations of syntactic objects to obtain results like e.g., a Lyndon Theorem (cf. 4.2, 5.10). Secondly, our semantic (Boolean) intuitions about quantifiers translate more or less directly into syntactic intuitions about modal formulas; as a result both old and new results connecting semantic constraints and special syntactic forms can easily be obtained (cf. 4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 5.10) .
Several specific open problems have already been stated in this paper. At this point we want to suggest some general issues that we think are worth further investigations.
First, there are a lot of higher order quantifiers whose modal (or sometimes even Boolean) theory is still pretty much terra incognita. Besides the ones mentioned in Section 5.4 these include probabilistic quantifiers like almost all, and cardinality quantifiers like more than n Xs are Ys (~ >_ ~).
With these and other quantifiers considered in earlier sections of this paper the precise nature of the individuals constituting our universes of discourse is irrelevant. A natural example of a sentence outside the scope of this extensional point of view is three boys eat four apples. To give a modal analysis of the quantifier patterns involved here one may have to move back to the more traditional approach to modal logic where the domain is structured by some relation R. E.g., one way to handle the above sentence would be to add to QUANT operators Nn interpreted as the original graded modalities, i.e., AA, w ~ Nn~a iff more than n R-successors of w satisfy % In such a calculus the above sentence may be represented as M!3(B A N!4A) -this representation has all the readings of the original sentence.
Another reason why one may want to have structured universes of discourse arises when one gives the operators considered in this paper a temporal interpretation as quantifiers over temporal entities. In such an interpretation one could add operators to structure the temporal domain to obtain one's favorite ordering. This would allow one to express such statements as 'it will be the case at least twice that there have been exactly three occasions at which held'. Finally, in Atzeni et al. (1988) a complete, but very restricted system for talking about set containment is studied. This system deals with statements of the form . . . ,  where Qi E { all, some } and the Xis and Y/s have no structure except maybe a negation sign. Thus, given that we also have a syllogistic, Boolean and modal analysis of all and some, there is a whole hierarchy of systems for dealing with these quantifiers. We think it may be well worth the effort to study this hierarchy more systematically, and to set up and study similar hierarchies for other pairs of dual quantifiers.
